I Just Love a Good Theory, 1: Five Key Theories of Embodiment

“There is nothing so practical as a good theory.” – Kurt Lewin (1890-1847)

All of us who are living now as well as those who were born into the world at the end of the 17^th century have grown up in a Cartesian world. This is a world where we were taught that the rational mind is everything, the physical world as well as the universe is just dead matter meant to be exploited for human benefit. A Cartesian world is populated by machine-bodies which are also essentially objects. Cartesianism makes us strangers in the world and strangers to ourselves.

This rather schizoid view has been challenged in recent decades with the explosion of new theories of what constitutes reality, consciousness, and the mind-body based on the concept of embodiment. Based on the implications of the embodied perspective, more and more people are accepting the fact that the body—not just the mind—plays a fundamental role in perception, thinking, and decision-making.

The idea originates in existential-phenomenology with Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger in the mid-twentieth century and then, by the end of the century by cognitive linguists and neuroscientists (e.g., Damasio, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). Wilson & Golonka (2013) define embodiment as:

“Embodiment is the surprisingly radical hypothesis that the brain is not the sole cognitive resource we have available to help us to solve problems. Our bodies and their perceptually-guided motions through the world do much of the work required to achieve our goals, replacing the need for complex internal mental representations. This simple fact utterly changes our idea of what “cognition” involves, and thus embodiment is not simply another factor acting on an otherwise disembodied cognitive processes” (p.1).

The embodiment view is utterly opposed to the Cartesian notions that thinking is the sole province of the brain: internal, symbolic, mechanical, and immaterial (Gibbs, 2003; also see Fahim & Eslamdoost, 2014 and Fahim & Rezenjad, 2014 for overviews on embodiment).

Now that the idea that human consciousness is body centered that the Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) is slowly being eroded by Corpus sum, ego cogito (I am body, therefore I think), a number of new theories based on embodiment have been developed and are great interest and practical application.

Body Conceptualization Theory

The body conceptualization theory views the body from two basic perspectives: body-as-process (as experienced) or the body-as-object (as it appears). Individuals are more positive about their bodies when they experience them as processes rather than as objects. Men are socialized to identify more with their body-as-process, whereas women are socialized to identify their bodies more as objects to be seen object (Franzoi, 1995). (For more detail, see my blog-lecture, “Are You A Rock or the River?”).

Developmental Theory of Embodiment

The developmental theory of embodiment is grounded in Piran’s (2016) qualitative research from in-depth interviews with Canadian girls and women across the lifespan. The theory identifies and explains the factors that:

(a) either support positive body image or disrupt it,

(b) make up the living experience of the body,

and (c) show how that experience occurs in real life (Piran, 2002, 2016, 2017; Piran & Teall, 2012).

Several of the factors that contribute to positive embodiment are body functionality, enjoyable physical activities, singing, and body awareness of needs and desires. Body functionality also protects girls and women against cultural pressures to view their bodies as purely aesthetic objects. Conversely, bypassing positive experiences of body functionality—such as by strict dieting or extreme overexercise—may contribute to body image disturbance. Emphasizing the physical appearance of one’s body, especially as an object of others’ desire and gaze, also contributes body image disturbance.

Embodied Cognition

We are not just embodied, but we are embedded in the world; we are part of the world and the world is part of us (Shapiro & Spaulding, 2014). The Cartesian mind-body split is fading in the light of the fact that consciousness is a brain-within-a-body-within-an-environment. All three play a role in human perception, reasoning, expression, and experience.

Descartes’ raising the mind over the body gave the Western world a new belief system and set it upon a different course. These beliefs have been handed down to us and have become essential ground assumptions about reality, the world, and ourselves. Cornerstone Cartesian beliefs include:

• The mind is completely rational.
• Thinking exclusively conscious and not related to the body.
• Intuition is a body-based experience that attempts to discolor and confuse reason; it is not to be trusted.
• Ideas are separate from external reality.
• The mind can be used as a tool to understand itself.
• Nothing about the biological nature of the body contributes to understanding the mind.
• The mind is not of the body and, therefore, not of this world.
• Because only humans possess rational thought, they may exalt themselves over the world and its creatures.

Embodied cognition attempts to revise these beliefs with new information from the cognitive sciences and takes a very different tack:

• Reasoning and thinking are based in the body and its sensory-motor systems.
• Every understanding we can have of ourselves and the world comes from body experience.
• The mind is not separate from the body.
• Most thought is unconscious and so the mind cannot be used to explore itself.
• Human nature is characterized not in a theory of essences (essential features), but in terms of change, variation, and evolution (processes) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).

Radical Embodiment Theory

This is a relatively new branch of embodied cognitive science that draws from ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory to understand how bodily capacities form and influence thinking processes (Barrett, 2011; Chemero, 2009). Dynamical systems are systems which change and evolve over time. They are non-linear and are organic in nature such as biological, cognitive, or social systems. A flock of birds in the area is a good example of a dynamical system. What makes radical embodiment theory radical is its argument that cognitive scientists need new conceptual tools if they are to understand the ways in which body-based cognition depends interacts with its environment. The classical view of the human brain as a biocomputer states it works according to the same principles as a digital computer with inputs and outputs, but a computer is not an organic system (Rupert, 2009). The radical embodiment camp is currently divided against itself into two different camps: the ecological vs. the enactive approaches (Baggs & Chemero, 2021). The enactive approach or Enactivism asserts that embodiment is a self-individuating system which makes it autonomous from other types of systems. This autonomy comes from the work of the work of Varela (1979) and his notion of autopoiesis. Autopoiesis is a characteristic exclusive to living systems and makes them self-organizing, self-perpetuating, and self-directed through their internal processes exchanging material and energy with the environment (Di Paolo & Thompson, 2014).

Objectification Theory

The objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) proposes that women are sexually objectified by being judged and valued for their physical aesthetics. Women can become conditioned to accept this objectification and, worse, to objectify themselves in the process. Objectification has two sides. The first is being objectified by others and the other is objectifying your own body-self. Self-objectification causes negative body image (e.g., body shame) and induces disordered eating. Men also can experience sexual- and self-objectification though not as much as women (Calogero, 2012; Moradi & Huang, 2008). When females of any age believe that their body is unconditionally accepted by others just the way it is, they soon realize a holistic appreciation of their body based on its functionality more so than its aesthetic appearance (Avalos & Tylka, 2006).

Less a theory of embodiment and more so a theory of embodied interpersonal relations or perhaps even a theory of disembodiment because of the forces that turn a living person into a object for personal, financial, or sexual gratification, especially the female body.

Tripartite Theory of Body Image Influence

This model proposes that three primary core sources of influence—parents, peers and media—contribute to the development of body image and eating disturbances. Additionally, the model suggests that at least two factors mediate the relationship between influences and disturbance—appearance comparison and internalization of media information (Van den Berg et al., 2002).

Although most of the early studies into the Tripartite Influence Model used white people for the subject base, later studies into other ethnic-cultural groups including black, Latina, and Asian women showed similar results especially the negative effects related to disordered eating patterns (Burke et al., 2021).

Closing Thoughts

While I find this material utterly fascinating, most readers will probably not and so ask themselves the question: “Why should I know this stuff?” Great question. Here’s some answers.

As somatic therapists it is important to at least have a basic understanding of the current state-of-the-science regarding embodied consciousness. The findings usually lead to theoretical models of health and disease and these offer insight and possibly predictive value.

It will help expand your perspective on clients, for example, knowing the differences between body as process vs. appearance is useful when listening to people talk about their bodies and likewise with objectification theory.

1. Many people have been physical and psychologically injured due to being objectified by others or objectifying themselves. Objectification theory offers insights into those wounding and possible clues for their healing.
2. To paraphrase Mark Twain’s saying about the weather, everybody talks about body image but doesn’t do anything about it. Understanding how body image is influenced helps bodyworkers bridge the gap between body worker to body coach and help people protect and nurture their own body images.
3. Finally, these theories are ALL anti-Cartesian and the start of a more holistic embodied perspective on our lives and the lives of others. This is can be very useful in changing how you see yourself, your clients, and the world especially if you consider yourself a holistic thinker.

And so, there really is nothing so practical as a good theory.

Paul Shane, Ph.D., LMT

Director, Academic Content

References

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Revised 03-14-25.